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Although Roger Sandall is right to worry about the threat of irrationalism, he is wrong 
to attribute it either to the left or to the arts and humanities. The issue is far more 
complex. Many on the left have, over the years, been attracted to ideologies that, in the 
name of subjecting every part of life to pure reason, have produced totalitarianism. The 
far right has been notoriously devoted to brutal irrationalisms of race and blood. 
For more than 200 years, the major conflict among western intellectuals has not 
been between the arts and science, but between a rationalism that would exclude the 
function of imagination and the romantics w h o exclude the role of reason. Yet, 
Coleridge and N e w m a n pointed out in the last century, and Popper or Polyani in this, 
successful workJboth science and the arts integrates the insight of the imagination with 
the precise labour of the intellect. 
The enemy of science today is not among literary and cultural theorists w h o 
try to understand the complexities of the world, but among those fundamentalists w h o 
believe that ancient texts can provide a literal explanation of the world. In the United 
States, so-called creation science goes hand in hand with puritan literary censors in 
stifling primary and secondary education, and so leaves students devoid of the 
intellectual resources that alone can defend them against irrationalism. The theorists 
w h o point out that science is also a cultural product do not deny the possibility of 
truth, or even our knowledge of particular facts, but emphasise the provisional nature 
of all the explanatory systems by which w e seek to give meaning to the elements of 
experience. 
The proposition that all meaning is socially constructed does not exclude the 
role of individuals in its construction. Rather, it points out that creative individuals 
belong in their o w n cultures, which in turn give them the tools, most particularly 
language, that enable them to work. While one of the roles of imagination is to enable 
individuals to see beyond the intellectual structures they have inherited, to see new 
ways of giving meaning to experience, none can position themselves on an 
Archimedean point outside the given world from which they can see it whole and use 
the lever of objective reason to shift it to a new plane of truth. W e are all constrained 
by w h o w e are, where w e live and what languages w e speak. 
Critics w h o point to the masculine forms of modern scientific thought, 
including its metaphors, are using their imagination to reveal an unnecessary limit 
scientists place on their o w n endeavours. The machine metaphor used for Newton's 
work advanced our understanding of physical laws in an external universe, but did 
nothing to advance our understanding of our o w n relation to that universe. In terms of 
human affairs, it led to what Blake - not a contemporary writer - characterised as 
Newton's sleep*. The rape metaphor, on the other hand, advances our understanding 
not only of h o w w e have used, or misused, science, but also of h o w use of this kind is 
inherent in the way w e have expressed the initial concept. By showing that w e can play 
"the gendered metaphor game' with any scientific discovery", Margarita Levin 
concedes the central point of cultural theory, that meaning is plural and produced by 
the culturally determined observer, not by the phenomenon itself, whether that 
phenomenon is an object in space or a script in a study. This ability to produce 
meaning is the glory of scientist, artist and humanist alike. 
As Sandall shows, absurdities can certainly be found on the wilder shores of 
cultural theory, just as they can be in science. Newton himself attached as much value 
to his studies in alchemy as he did to his discoveries in physics. The scientific world in 
this generation has been much disturbed by scientists w h o have resorted to fraud to 
prove otherwise unsupported theories. The premature release of rabbit virus from its 
supposedly impregnable C S I R O trialling grounds may be an example of the rape 
metaphor, or perhaps of the equally ancient principle of hubris. But none of these 
events in itself discredits science, any more than the more extreme projections of 
theory discredit the humanities, or an occasional nonsense does the arts. But all of 
these disciplines are discredited as long as they merely dismiss thoughtful criticism, 
particularly criticism that challenges their fundamental assumptions. 
The rise of superstition at the end of the twentieth century demands 
explanation as well as denunciation. Often it reflects fear of a technology out of 
control, or in the control of corporations and authorities answerable to no wider public 
interest. It also reflects a widespread social collapse which threatens to take from 
individuals control over even their immediate circumstances. Just as the Luddites had 
reason to oppose technologies that were destroying their means of livelihood and their 
ancestral dwelling-places, so their modern successors attack science because they 
cannot get at the men w h o control it, and turn to superstition because reason is not 
enough to satisfy their human needs. 
The restoration of control over our circumstances and environment depends, as 
Sandall rightly emphasises, on scientific knowledge. But it also requires an 
understanding of the limitations of science and of the reasons people are turning from 
it. This will require the efforts of artists, historians, sociologists and cultural theorists. 
It will also require some degree of self-criticism from scientists, a recognition that 
there are many paths to knowledge, and many means of advancing even scientific 
knowledge. Our future depends on neither science nor the arts, but on their mutual co-
operation. 
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